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The end of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the projected completion of Operation
Enduring Freedom in 2014 present strategic budgetary challenges to our political and senior military leaders. As the U.S. Army transitions from an organization at war to an organization focused on garrison-based training, the requirement to retain the munitions Defense Industrial Base (DIB) capability is absolutely necessary. This essay describes the current status of the munitions DIB, identifies the current types of facilities in the federal inventory, and provides analysis on capacity for policy adjustments. It focuses on the U.S. Army's strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and the Army of 2020 to identify any excess or shortfalls in the current capacity. It then recommends changes to facility types and locations to maximize efficiency and effectiveness of future munitions support.
Defense Industrial Base (DIB): Munitions Realignment for 2020
The Joint Force will be prepared to confront and defeat aggression anywhere in the world. It will have the ability to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities, ensuring that we can meet any future threats, by investing in our people and a strong industrial base.
-Leon E. Panetta ( 2 In 2014, the Army will conclude over 13 years of conflict and begin reducing and rebalancing the force. Subsequent changes in force structure will complicate the strategic environment. In this turbulent environment, DOD leaders are challenged to realign the munitions Defense Industrial Base (DIB) to support the future Joint Force. They must consider realignment options to achieve immediate savings, but they must as well avoid short-term solutions that degrade munitions preparedness and prove to be costly over time.
This essay describes the current disposition of facilities and the capability of the organic munitions DIB. It seeks to determine whether the current capacity is sufficient to support the Joint Force of 2020. Historical patterns of neglect during interwar periods include lack of managerial control, under-funding, and long lead times for ammunition production. Forthcoming decisions on base closures and realignments will impact the munitions DIB. To provide a useful background for these decisions, this essay examines were to gain independence. In total, 27 facilities were established for the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. Immediately following the war, dramatic cuts in military expenditures were implemented, causing major cuts in ammunition production.
The munitions DIB was reduced to four facilities, which significantly limited munitions production in support of the War of 1812. That same year, Congress recognized the shortfall in capacity, funding, and management and implemented an annual authorization of defense funds. Also, it established the Ordnance Department (OD) to conduct the business of providing war materials. 3 Despite the efforts of Congress, the newly formed OD struggled to build national capacity to keep pace with expansion of the country and increased need for munitions.
In 1862, the OD presented a plan to execute a "grand arsenal' concept, which addressed capacity shortfalls. Although supported by Congress in principle, it was not resourced. Decision makers sought to reduce the size, to consolidate, and to modernize the DIB. However, the new arsenals served only to meet peacetime requirements and maintain the human capital to support expansion for wartime needs and sustain research and development. When expansion was required, the OD plan was to contract additional production capability to support those requirements. Although political leaders understood the growing requirements, often domestic programs drew more funding than the nation's investments in its ammunition infrastructure. This arsenal base and commercial contracting plan serves as the foundation for the current munitions DIB. 4 
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As the country prepared for WWI, OD efforts to support total war proved to be inadequate. Many existing facilities could not meet wartime requirements. A planning board determined the munitions DIB was in dire need of expansion and modernization.
Even if funds were provided to expand manufacturing, it would take months to acquire the machine tools and technical expertise required for execution. As troops were committed overseas, Great Britain and France agreed to provide U.S. forces with ammunition in exchange for production of smokeless powder, high explosives, and In the 1990s, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the National Defense University (NDU), and National Academy of Sciences published several documents that highlighted concerns with reports of excess inventory within the services, the SMCA's lack of visibility of retail assets, and inconsistent ratings of the condition of ammunition.
14 Funding gaps and reporting issues resurfaced in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. Ammunition with temporary condition codes that had returned from ODS remained in the inventory, posing serious problems. Reports at the time were based on volume, not condition, which created strategic risks. To address these risks, the SMCA days from Indonesia to Japan, and 5.8 days from Indonesia to Korea. 28 It is clear that transportation within the Asia-Pacific region is cheaper than a shipment from the West coast, which is less expensive than from the East coast.
With no existing production capability on the West coast, the key factor that adds additional transportation cost and time is the movement required to ship ammunition at least 1,700 miles across the U.S. to reach MOTCO. Traveling at least 400 miles per day adds an additional four days or more for Pacific coast movement by ground or rail. This reality is neither responsive nor fiscally prudent given current fiscal conditions and the continuing rise in transportation costs. A correction of this deficiency helps to improve the munitions DIB operational reach that benefits the Joint Force through 2040.
The current munitions DIB infrastructure reflects the decisions made ten years or more ago. Therefore decisions made today will certainly have impacts into the next decade and beyond. As the U.S. transitions from over a decade of conflict to the challenges of 2020, it is important to make reversible decisions. "Reversibility is a concept that is a key part of the decision calculus -including the vectors on which we place our industrial base. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. 
Strategic Options
In order to improve operational reach and prepare the munitions DIB for the Army of 2020, consider the following four options: 1) continue to operate as currently aligned;
2) further diversify capability among existing facilities while eliminating the least productive facilities and execute a capital investment to meet production requirements for the West coast and the Asia-Pacific region; 3) seek foreign sources of supply and Security of Supply arrangements to fulfill future Asia-Pacific regional requirements while reducing or maintaining the CONUS munitions DIB production capability; or 4) execute a balanced mix of the three previous options to achieve the greatest level of reversibility and improve operational reach.
Option 1: Status Quo
Continue to operate as currently aligned. This option recommends no immediate changes to the munitions DIB and supports continued operations as currently aligned.
The challenge to continue to right-size the munitions DIB competes between two requirements -the need to maintain reserve capacity to replenish war reserves and a fiscal requirement to meet peacetime demands.
With the recent completion of the 2005 BRAC decisions, the JMC needs protected time to stabilize the munitions DIB. The requirement to retrograde or reposition OIF and OEF ammunition will not be completely realized until the OEF mission is complete in fiscal year 2014.The inspection and condition code application process will require time before final disposition is determined. Additionally, the rebalancing of forces within CONUS will not be complete until the remaining units from OEF redeploy and training requirements stabilize. The ability of the munitions DIB to sustain readiness can only be achieved when manning requirements for steady state operations can be determined. The way to mitigate the volatility associated with uncertain requirements is to let the munitions DID stabilize war reserves and sustainment requirements before making an uninformed decision affecting personnel for the near term, mid-term, and long term support to the force.
The consolidation of redundant facilities and improved production capability has already enhanced responsiveness while eliminating the cost of idle facilities. The divestiture of organic production to contracted operations has reduced facility costs to the government while maintaining intellectual capital and gaining technological 21 improvements in production. The execution of the 2005 BRAC and the application of legislation helped to achieve the "Deputy Secretary of Defense order that to the maximum extent feasible, the Army will transition government owned ammunition production assets to the private sector." 31 There are only two GOGO facilities at this time producing inherently governmental products and critical go-to-war items. The current munitions infrastructure provides sufficient capacity to meet the future demand. This is supported by the munitions DIB success in support of ODS, OIF, and OEF. The shortfall in ammunition production at the LCAAP was corrected and is better postured. As most of the munitions DIB is commercially operated and profit oriented, future production will drive manning and costs to align with requirements. This self-correcting situation encourages the DOD to resist temptation to right-size before the time is right.
This option does not address rising transportation costs, a lack of balance to the West coast, or support to the Asia-Pacific region. The risk associated with status quo is the historical trend to reduce munitions funding during inter-war periods. Congress, the DOD, and the Army must protect funding to accomplish JMC's two requirements.
Option 2: Western Shift
The second option calls for further diversification of capability among existing facilities while eliminating the least productive facilities and executing a capital investment to meet production requirements for the West coast and Asia-Pacific region.
The objective is to achieve improved regional orientation toward the western U.S. in 
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The second risk is that competition between foreign and national companies could potentially drive our industrial capacity to reduced levels that are incapable of supporting a deployed Army. History already provides samples of neglect to the munitions DIB when underfunding occurs. Shortfalls in production or requirements in excess of warm based capacity would take months to overcome. Risk assessments would be necessary to evaluate the security of supply on a case by case basis.
Contracted companies could potentially over commit and prove unreliable if they have competing national requirements. Additionally, a change in political favor would create a strategic dilemma placing unpredicted strain on the munitions DIB. The JMC must weigh the benefits to risks to avoid over reliance on any one foreign source.
Any decision to support this option would not warrant the closure of existing facilities, but would encourage reduced organic production and significantly reduce transportation time. During the OIF/OEF small arms ammunition shortfall, the United Kingdom provided required assistance through this arrangement. Maintaining multiple options prevents over reliance and builds a portfolio of choices. Current U.S. legislation supports this option and monitors its sensitivity annually in reports to Congress to maintain visibility on contracts, and safeguard National interests.
Consideration of this option also provides capability beyond our borders in the event of a loss to one of our two ammunition ports. Transportation issues affecting support to ODS should be a lesson applied to future mobilization planning. The option is not risk aversive, however, the very nature of the problem requires consideration of solutions that achieve balanced distribution and increased operational reach.
Option 4: Balanced Mix
Execute a balanced mix of the three previous options to achieve the greatest latitude for reversibility. The fourth and final proposed option executes components of the other options. Initially, no action is taken for at least three to five years in order to allow requirements to reach equilibrium. On-going competitive analysis would be conducted in existing facilities. The worst performers would be considered for closure. 
Recommendation
The balanced mix option offers the best flexibility through its consolidated approach. It includes reversibility, redundancy, partnership, and fiscal responsibility.
Accepting the current posture on munitions facilities and capability for the next five years requires patience. No immediate actions are required to execute this option.
However, detailed planning and analysis is required to forecast the desirability of regional options, both continental and abroad. It provides an opportunity for deliberations by business professionals, political leaders, and Army leaders.
The potential long-term cost savings and operational reach generated by this option outweighs the political barriers that might accompany approval to "Go West" and seek more foreign sources. These must be overcome. The inclination to act in a time of Support of the new strategic orientation toward regional allies will also facilitate strengthened partnerships if foreign companies win contracts to provide munitions.
Regionally aligned allies with capable and committed industries will not only improve their economic well-being but are also expected to provide reciprocated benefits in other areas, especially technology. With an improved distribution network across the country and around the world, the benefits of improved positioning not only support sustained training for our military but also reduce requirements for mobilization, for cargo space, and for transportation by positioning munitions support as far forward as possible.
Current and future leaders need to improve regional distribution of munitions production. During the Cold War industrialization was heavily weighted toward the East Coast, which led to closures of government-owned facilities in the Western U.S. Capital investments in infrastructure across the nation during the mid-20 th Century should be leveraged in this new century. Empty buildings across the nation can meet capacity
